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SETTLING DIRECT DISPUTES WITH SOVEREIGNS: STRIVING
FOR TRANSPARENCY IN THE SETTLEMENT OF PUBLICPRIVATE PARTNERSHIP DISPUTES*
Jodo Ribeiro-Bidaoui, Tony Andriotis, Soo-Hyun Lee, Jean-Isamu Taguchi**
INTRODUCTION'
Much ink has been spilt on discussing whether or not the Investor-State Dispute
Settlement ("ISDS") regime, has played a role in encouraging the growth of developing
economies by creating a more secure system for Foreign Direct Investment ("FDI"). As of
late, the viability of the treaty arbitration system has been called into question. Some
developing countries are threatening to retract themselves from dispute settlement
mechanisms ("DSMs"), such as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes ("ICSID") completely, while sovereignty-related alarms can now be heard loudly in
the halls of cities such as Washington, London, and Brussels.2 The authors do not wish to
reiterate or re-litigate any of the arguments advanced by such States. They do see, however,
mutually shared advantages to international trade and investment and in harmonizing legal
codes. These advantages include bolstered investor confidence in the certainty of due
diligence by recipient States and improved trade and investment flows that can provide the
* The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the UN.
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LA
TIMEs (August 19, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-trade-court-dispute-20150819-story.htnl.
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necessary capital to help economies pursue inclusive and sustainable economic development.
We particularly see such advantages in embracing a model of transparency in dispute
resolution as put forth in the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (the
"Rules on Transparency") and in the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treatybased Investor-State Arbitration (New York, 2014) (the "Mauritius Convention"), hereinafter
the "UNCITRAL Transparency Standards", in situations where disputes are directly related to
the interests of citizens and taxpayers, namely on what concern Public-Private Partnership
("PPPs"). This paper examines these issues and presents suggestions as to how to address
them.
The Mauritius Convention was adopted by the UN General Assembly in December
of 2014. This adoption allowed Parties to investment treaties concluded before April 1, 2014
to express their consent to apply the Rules on Transparency, and is significant in regards to
the suggested reforms to the arbitral processes for resolving investor-State disputes to ensure
greater transparency and accessibility to the public. We see advantages in heightening
transparency in the current investment treaty arbitration system, specifically through the
UNCITRAL Transparency Standards. Such transparency in dispute settlement results in
strengthening the rule of law while continuing to emphasize the importance of encouraging
FDI flows to the growth of developing economies. PPPs in infrastructure have been
considered a vector within FDI, but have unique qualities that distinguish them from other
forms of foreign investment. PPPs are closely aligned with the public interest as they are
often entered into with the purpose of delivery of public services through infrastructure
projects. These projects thus often deal with the conveyance of key utilities, such as water,
sewage and electricity, as well as the extraction of natural resources, which are frequently tied
in to lucrative government concessions. The public authority is thus incentivized to achieve
4
value for money and can retain specific prerogatives in the project's regulation. In order to
ensure the confidence of foreign investors in a PPP arrangement while also increasing the
amount of FDI inflows, it is necessary to guarantee investors' rights through sound DSMs.
For this reason, this paper focuses on disputes in PPPs involving international investors-also
called "international PPPs"-and seeks to provide recommendations for improved
transparency therein.
DEFINING PPPS
The World Bank describes PPPs as entailing "long-term contract[s] between a
private party and a government entity, for providing a public asset or service, in which the
private party bears significant risks and management responsibility, and remuneration is

3 STEPHEN THOMSEN, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ENCOURAGING
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN THE UTILITIES SECTOR: THE ROLE OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 141

(2005).
4 This is particularly the case in civil law countries. See The World Bank Group, Key Issues in Civil Law
Systems That May Impact PPP Projects, PUB.-PRIVATE P'SHIP ININFRASTRUCTURE RES. CENTER (February
https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/legislation-regulation/framework2017),
23,
assessment/legal-systems/key-issues-in-civil-law-systems.
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linked to performance." 5 Apart from these features (long-term contract, risk management and
responsibility), PPP projects are considered to be complex, in designing and
managing/governing contracts,6 and, as noted above, concern the interest of current and future
citizens, both as taxpayers and service users. Even, however, where such funds are not
primarily rooted in the tax base of the contracting sovereign, such as where development
funds are utilized, the need for transparency is of particular importance. Regardless of the
extent to which the State becomes involved in a PPP, its involvement imposes marginal social
costs in either the form of an explicit cost or an opportunity cost. For instance, a State may
choose to allocate a large role for itself in a PPP by directly financing, either through loan or
grant, the project in some form, or by waiving certain administrative costs or applicable taxes.
Alternatively, the State may play a more intermediary role by hedging risks by underwriting
investments or providing investor protection against indemnity. A third alternative can be that
the State helps channel products from international financial institutions into PPPs or private
finance from commercial banks or other enterprises.7 The very fact that the State chooses to
undertake a PPP means that it diverts its attention from another potential project, meaning that
such decisions need to retain high levels of transparency to ensure accountability.
Additionally, the delivery of public service and the use of public funds also require high
levels of transparency to ensure accountability.
While there are no strict models as to the form a PPP can take, they typically
involve a public authority ordering the project, and a private company created for the purpose
of the project: a Special Purpose Vehicle ("SPV"). The SPV is created by project proponents
through equity investment.' The private company may take the form of a project company, or
an SPV that works between private entities like construction companies and the sponsors of
the project (the equity owners or financiers). The public authority or State-owned enterprises
("SOEs") can own equity of the SPV when deemed necessary. The extent to which the public
entity and private entity are involved in the financing and operation of the project is diverse.
For instance, ordinarily, the SPV would obtain most of the required funding for the project
through a bank loan. Investors can be local, but also international, such as international
commercial banks, development finance institutions, bilateral agencies, and multilateral
development banks. 9 In order to realize the project, the SPV also sub-contracts other
stakeholders such as consultants, operators and managers. The SPV repays its liabilities and
pays out shares on the income generated during the project's operation.

The World Bank Group et al., Public-Private Partnerships- Reference Guide Version 2.0, at 17 (2014),
https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/library/public-private-partnerships-reference-guideversion-20.
6 Id. at 42, 89.
7 The World Bank Group, Government Support in FinancingPPPs,PUB. -PRIVATE P'SHIP IN INFRASTRUCTURE
RES. CENTER (February 2, 2017), https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/financing/governmentsupport-subsidies.
8 The World Bank Group et al., supra note 5, at 50.
' The World Bank Group, Investors in Infrastructure in Developing Countries, PUB.-PRIVATE P'SHIP IN
INFRASTRUCTURE
RES.
CENTER
(January
27,
2015),
http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-privatepartnership/financing/investors-developing-countries.
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Figure 1. Contractual structure of a PPP.

0

This structure shows that a PPP project is a "network of interrelated contracts and
other legal relationships involving various parties."" Disputes in a PPP project can arise
regarding any of these contractual relationships. This paper focuses on a particular type of
dispute arising in PPP, namely disputes directly involving the contracting authority, which is
often a Sovereign or an Agency thereto.
As discussed above, the contractual structure of a PPP is particularly prone to
disputes due to the existence of multiple contractual relationships as well as the risks
transferred between stakeholders. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Privately Financed
Infrastructure Projects distinguishes three types of disputes that can arise between the
stakeholders: (1) disputes between the contracting authority and the SPV; (2) disputes
between the SPV and sub-contractors; and (3) disputes between the SPV and other parties,
such as end users.1 2 Moreover, it is necessary to mention that within a PPP, specific disputes
can arise at various stages of the project that are related to the awarding of contracts. We are
herein focusing primarily on the first type of dispute-those between a Sovereign and a private
party.
OVERVIEW OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN PPP TRANSACTIONS
When PPPs involve long-term arrangements between two or more parties, the risk
of conflicts over issues such as service quality, customer satisfaction, and tariff reviews are
'o The World Bank Group, Concessions, Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and Design-Build-Operate (DBO)
Projects, PUB.-PRIVATE P'SHIP IN INFRASTRUCTURE RES. CENTER (2014), http://ppp.worldbank.org/publicprivate-partnership/agreements/concessions-bots-dbos.
" United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Privately
Financed

Infrastructure

UNITED

Projects,

NATIONS

173

(2001),

http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/pfip/guide/pfip-e.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL].
12 id.
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especially high. 13 The World Bank mentions that "PPP arrangements are long-term and
complex, contracts [that] tend to be incomplete," so subsequently "this creates room for
differences in interpretation." 14 Therefore, DSMs allow for the quick resolution of disputes
between public and private parties, while avoiding disruption of public services. In giving its
recommendation related to the governance of PPP projects, the Organization for the
Economic Co-Operation and Development ("OECD") provided that "clear, predictable and
transparent rules for dispute resolution should be in place to resolve disagreement on the
above between the public and private parties."" Practitioners have also argued that "careful
attention must be given to managing potential disputes in [PPP] projects."' 6 Finally, the lack
of trust in the treatment that will be given to Sovereigns (or, more likely, parties opposed to a
Sovereign) under domestic judicial systems is also a factor in favor of alternative dispute
resolution systems. 17 In assessing these statements together, one finds that PPP projects
interweave procedural with agency conflicts, resulting in legal and policy narratives that my
easily find themselves at odd of each other.
The World Bank provides the comprehensive study in relation to infrastructure
concession, describing both binding (court litigation and arbitration) and non-binding
mechanisms (conciliation, mediation and expert panels), with a focus on international
arbitration. After defining the advantages and shortcomings of all these means (time, costs),
the study provides a table comparing different mechanisms and their appropriateness for
concession (see Table 1). The UN further explains that the dispute resolution mechanism that
would be the most appropriate depends on the nature of the dispute, and that usually
"mediation and/or arbitration are the most commonly chosen options."" Finally, practitioners
would refer to the same mechanisms. 19 It is important to notice that experts do not
recommend a particular type of alternative dispute resolution mechanism, since this choice
depends on the nature of the dispute, making this issue highly contextual.

1
Mechanisms
of
Conflict
Resolution,
UNDP
(December
16,
2014),
http://pppue.undp.2margraf com/en/20_4.htm.
14 The World Bank Group et al., supra note 5, at 164.
15 Recommendation of the Council on Principlesfor Public Governance ofPublic-PrivatePartnerships,OECD
(May 2012), http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgetingfPPP-Recommendation.pdf
16
David Baxter, Dispute Resolution in PPP Projects, LINKEDIN (November 14, 2014),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20141101213519-51548441 -dispute-resolution-in-ppp-projects;
Resolving
Disputes in PrivatePublic PartnershipAgreements: Choosing Between Litigation, Mediation and Arbitration,
DIAZ REUZ (November 2010), http://diazreus.com/resolving-disputes-in-privatepublic-partnership-agreements/
[hereinafter Resolving Disputes].
17 Chris Skelcher, Governing Partnerships, in INT'L HANDBOOK ON PUB.-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 298
(Graeme A. Hodge et al., ed., 2010).
8 UNCITRAL, supra note 11.

19 Baxter, supra note 16; Resolving Disputes, supra note 16.
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A few country case studies on alternative dispute resolution in PPPs have been
2
written, but these do not always deal with international PPPs. 1
As to treaty arbitration, the ICSID has been criticized for disproportionately
emphasizing commercial and private interests.2 2 New practices of local dispute resolution
have also emerged.2 3 During the UNCITRAL colloquium on PPPs, for example, participants
questioned the suitability of utilizing international arbitration for PPP-related disputes, mainly
because of the "multiple investment treaties, multiple international arbitration forums, cases

Michel Kerf et al., Concessionsfor Infrastructure:A Guide to Their Design and Award, WORLD BANK
PUBLICATIONs 80 (1998), http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10. 1596/0-8213-4165-0.
21 Mt Adekilekun et al., Public-Private Partnership Initiative in Nigeria and Its Dispute Resolution
Mechanism:
An
Appraisal,
1
J
of Malay.
and Comparative Law
40
(2014),
http://umrefjoumal.um.edu.my/public/article-view.php?id=6429; Boris Stanic, Arbitration-Selected Issues:
Arbitration and Public-Private PartnershipContracts, 16 CROAT ARBIT. YEARB. 173-369 (2009); Alejandro
Jadresic, Expert Panels in Regulation of Infrastructure in Chile (Pub.-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility,
Working
Paper
No
2,
2006),
20

http://www.ppiaforg/sites/ppiaf.org/files/documents/toolkits/highwaystoolkit/6/bibliography/pdf/experts_panel

s in regulationof infrastructure in chile.pdf; Peter Sheridan, PFI/PPPDisputes, 4 EUR. PUB. PRIV. P'SHIP L.
REV. 92 (2009); Arnoldo Wald & Jean Kalicki, The Settlement of Disputes Between the Public Administration
andPrivateCompanies by Arbitrationunder BrazilianLaw, 26 J. INT'L ARB. 557-78 (2009).
22 Seungwoo Son, Legal Analysis on Public-PrivatePartnershipsRegarding Model PPPRules, UNCITRAL 21
https://www.uncitral.org/pdflenglish/colloquia/public-private-partnerships(2012),
2013/20120704_Report on PPP legal IssuesSonSeungwoover.11.pdf; Virginia A. Greiman, Public/Private
Conundrum in InternationalInvestment Disputes: Advancing Investor Community Partnerships,32 Whittier L.

Rev. 395 (2010).
23 Greiman, supra note
23.
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and rulings and the poor enforcement of international arbitral awards." 24 Participants further
added that the tendency of using local dispute resolution involving governments should be
taken into account and that "a more practical approach would be helpful." 2 5 Furthermore, at
its fiftieth annual session held in July 2017, UNCITRAL announced that it would entrust its
Working Group III ("WGIII") with a broad mandate to work on reform of ISDS. 26
Specifically, WGIII has been tasked with identifying concerns regarding ISDS while
considering possible reforms and developing recommendations for UNCITRAL's
consideration. 2 7
The considerable variation in the type of arrangements made in PPPs, combined
with the unique characteristics of PPPs themselves, enable the use of a wide range of dispute
resolution mechanisms. Delmon, described a comprehensive concession agreement as
employing a mixture of dispute resolution mechanisms that best minimizes the "detriment to
[the contracting parties'] working relationship." 28 This echoes the recommendations given in
the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Privately Funded Infrastructure Projects, which calls
for the need for the use of dispute settlement mechanisms "that avoid as much as possible the
escalation of disagreements between the parties and preserve their business relationship; that
prevent the disruption of the construction works or the provision of the services; and that are
tailored to the particular characteristics of the disputes that may arise." 29 Given the necessity
to maintain the continuity of public services in PPPs projects, intergovernmental bodies like
the World Bank,30 the United Nations Development Programme ("UNDP") 31 UNCITRAL 32
and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
("UNESCAP") have cautioned against the use of litigation as a primary means of resolving
PPP-related disputes.33
PPP DISPUTE FILINGS AND CURRENT STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
While it is difficult to estimate the exact number of disputes arising out of PPPs that
have gone through ADR, a survey conducted by the law firm Diaz Reuz showed that 44% of
143 large, multinational companies involved in PPPs favored international arbitration over
litigation, especially in countries where confidence in national court systems remained low.3 4

24 U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, Possible Future Work in Public-Private
Partnerships

(PPPs),$ 47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/820 (July 7, 2014).
25 Id.

26 http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2017/unisl250.html
27 Id.

28 JEFFREY DELMON, PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE: PROJECT FINANCE, PPP PROJECTS

AND RISK 406 (Alphen Aan Den Rijn et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2009)..
29 UNCITRAL, supranote
11, at 174.
3

Patricia 0. Sulser & Cyril Chem, Keeping Public-PrivatePartnershipInfrastructureProjectson Track: The

Power of Multistakeholder Partnering Committees and Dispute Boards in Emerging-Market Infrastructure

Projects, in 5 THE WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEw 25 (Hassane
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/1 0.1596/978-1-4648-0037-5_chl.
31 UNCITRAL, supranote 11.
32 UNCITRAL, supranote 11, at 183.

Ciss6

et

al.,

eds.,

2013),

" UNESCAP, A GUIDEBOOK ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN INFRASTRUCTURE 74 (2011).

34 Resolving Disputes, supranote 16.

223

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

7

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 3

THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

States are also embracing ADR to settle PPP disputes. The following is a list of legislative
trends of some countries:
*
PHILIPPINES: The Philippines mandated by law that all PPP contracts
contain alternative dispute resolution clauses (Executive Order no. 78,
2012). This additionally mandated the creation of a PPP Centre that
oversees relevant dispute resolution."
*
AUSTRALIA: ADR, particularly expert adjudication, was identified as a
preferred means of dispute resolution in Australia due to the technical
36
complexity of projects in PPPs.
*
BRAZIL: In order to attract more PPPs, Brazil enacted the "Public-Private
Partnership law" in 2004 that allowed for arbitration in disputes arising
from PPPs.37 Brazil's Labour Commission has also recently approved a
bill that permits arbitration in public-private partnership contract disputes.
The measures in the proposed legislation are designed to speed up the
dispute resolution process and to make it easier for foreign firms to enter
PPPs. 1
*
GREECE: Greece mandated in 2005 (Law 3389/2005) that any disputes
arising from PPPs "shall be settled by arbitration" with a creation of a PPP
Secretariat to evaluate projects.
*
EGYPT: To attract more cross-border PPPs, Egypt amended the rules on
arbitration to create the Cairo International Arbitration Centre for disputes
arising from PPPs based on UNCITRAL rules.4 0
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE SOVEREIGN: COURTS AND
REGULATORY AGENCIES
The efficacy of national judicial processes or related national bodies to resolve
grievances through litigation is largely dependent on whether these domestic processes can
render an adequate and unbiased ruling. As the European Investment Bank ("EIB") expressed
through its European PPP Expertise Centre ("EPC"), the use of national regulatory bodies or
national court systems involves the judicial or regulatory discretion, which may present risks
for private investor in the partnership. 41 Given the considerable public interest involved in a
PPP project, objective decisions are more likely to be found through a third-party arbitration

3 ADR Now Mandatory in PPP Projects, PHIL.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION CTR. (Sept. 15, 2012),
http://www.pdrci.org/2012/09/15/adr-now-mandatory-in-ppp-projects/.
3
Michael Earwaker, Resolving PPP Disputes through Arbitration, LEXOLOGY, (September 22, 2009),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-4blf3ale-64b7-48b0-9bfb-02a6326e49f0.
3 Clivio Valenga Filho, Brazil's New Public-PrivatePartnershipLaw: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back,
22 J. INT'L ARB. 419-26 (2005).
38
Daniel Bland, Brazil Mulls PPP Dispute Arbitration Bill, BNAMERICAS (Nov. 19, 2014),
http://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/infrastructure/brazil-mulls-ppp-dispute-arbitration-billl.
39 Marily Paralika, PPPLaw Brings Positive Change to Public, PrivateSectors in Greece, LEXOLOGY (2008),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-ed694e2f-d95c-4de6-96cd-f417b923dbcc.
40
Patrick Werr, Egypt to Allow Arbitration on PPP Disputes, REUTERS (Feb. 15, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/ozabs-egypt-arbitration-idAFJOE81EOOL20120215.
41 See generally Study on PPPLegal & FinancialFrameworks in the MediterraneanPartnerCountries, EUR.
INY. BANK (2011), http://www.eib.org/attachments/med/ppp-study-volume-2.pdf.
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process. Since PPP projects are complex in that they can involve a variety of parties from
different backgrounds-whether cultural or technical-it can be difficult to identify a national
court system that can satisfy these different needs or that would be acceptable by all
contracting parties.4 2
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Due to its flexibility, neutrality, and accessibility, commercial arbitration is
commonly used to settle PPP-related disputes. Despite, however, considerable developments
that have made commercial arbitration procedures more transparent and predictable, barring
the occasional need to file awards with courts that require transparency where one seeks to
enforce an award, commercial arbitration tends not to be the most transparent vehicles of
dispute settlement. Many practitioners have continued to raise "confidentiality" as a key
reason why they recommend commercial arbitration to their clients. In fact, in the 2015
Queen Mary University of London/White & Case survey: Improvements and Innovations in
InternationalArbitration, 33% of respondents said that confidentiality was of primary
importance in their decision to use arbitration as a dispute settlement mechanism. As
commercial arbitration tends not to include sovereign parties, there is far less of a need for the
same level of transparency which is being demanded in the UNCITRAL Transparency
Standards. Along the same lines, while commercial arbitration has shown to be an appropriate
means for settling PPP-related disputes, Delmon points out that should a contract include a
government or government entity, "the private contracting party must take into consideration
the risk that the government entity may have immunity and the difficulty of executing arbitral
decisions against government assets." 4 4
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
Whether disputes arising from PPPs are addressed by international commercial
arbitration or investment dispute settlement depends on whether the cause of a dispute
involves issues beyond investments and the rights of an investor, as among other things,
protecting investments in regards to expropriation, fair and equitable treatment,
discrimination and contractual terms that fall under umbrella clauses. Especially when dealing
with Sovereigns or government entities, the private party in a PPP may find that arbitral
awards rendered by commercial arbitration are not enforceable. This can happen for a number
of reasons under provisions that deal with public interest, public policy, or social justice, as
can also be seen in Article V (2) of the New York Convention. In such instances, international
investment arbitration, through institutions like ICSID, provides dispute settlement services
that would be stricter with its adherence to procedure and enforcement.
While investment arbitration in its traditional form may be limited in its capacity to
handle PPPs, a recent development that warrants comment is the Investment Court System
("ICS"), which was approved by the European Commission (the "EC") in September 2015.
Emphasis on transparency and the inclusion of an Appeals Tribunal are notable characteristics
DELMON, supranote 28, at 406.
Paul Friedland et al., 2015 internationalArbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International
Arbitration, WHITE & CASE ET AL. 6 (2015), http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/164761.pdf.
44 DELMON, supranote 28, at 408.
42
4
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of the proposed system. It is yet to be known whether the new system can break the extant
ISDS mold and remain relevant in the face of fluctuating investment patterns. Increasing
criticism of ISDS for its lack of transparency and the release of the UNCITRAL Transparency
Standards have increased the global calls for change in the system. Related talks on the
establishment of a multilateral investment court began under UNCITRAL auspices in late
2017.45 On September 13, 2017, the EC, partly as a means of addressing the above stated
ISDS related criticisms, published a Recommendation for a Council Decision authorizing the
opening of negotiations for a Convention establishing a multilateral court for the settlement of
46
investment disputes. The EC adopted and published the negotiating directives on March 20,
2018, authorizing the EC to negotiate a convention establishing such a multilateral court on
behalf of the European Union.4 7
As is noted above, one criticism of the existing ICSID framework lies in a perceived
bias in favor of investors from developed countries.48 The ICSID framework is also criticized
for its lack of transparency. 49 Finally, the lack of appellate mechanisms raised criticism from
0
several UNASUR members who supported the creation of an alternative forum for ISDS.
These criticisms against the existing ISDS framework partly led to the creation of an
arbitration center under the Union of South American Nations ("UNASUR"). Though Latin
American countries were involved in 39% of all investment arbitration cases before ICSID,
Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia particularly stand out in relation to their
involvement in Investment Treaty Disputes." Ecuador first proposed the new system in 2010
and the UNASUR responded and began work on the creation of a new dispute settlement
system. 52 As of August 2016, a consensus was reached over almost 80% of the proposed rules
54
of the UNASUR Arbitration Center," and a code of conduct for arbitrators was adopted.
The proposed rules of UNASUR Arbitration Centre are relevant to specific concerns
regarding PPP disputes, such as enhanced transparency and the availability of an appeals
mechanism. The proposed rules provide that arbitral award and conciliation agreement must
be made available to the public unless domestic legislation forbids the release of such
information or if the information is confidential. 5 Proposed Article 5 favors consultations and

' http://www.europarl.europa.eullegislative-train/theme-a-balanced-and-progressive-trade-policy-to-hamessglobalisation/file-multilateral-investment-court-(mic)
46

Id.

Id.
Kendall Grant, The ICSID Under Siege: UNASUR and the Rise of a Hybrid Regime for International
Investment Arbitration, 52 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 6 (2015).
Silvia Karina Fiezzoni, The Challenge of UNASUR Member Countries to Replace ICSID Arbitration, 2
4
BEIJING L. REV. 136 (2011).
5o Grant, supra note 48, at 8.
* Catharine Titi, Investment Arbitration in Latin America, 30 ARB. INT'L 357 (2014).
52 Fiezzoni, supra note 49, at 140.
s' Katia Fach Gomez & Catharine Titi, UNASUR Centrefor the Settlement of Investment Disputes: Comments
on
the
Draft
Constitutive
Agreement,
INV.
TREATY
NEWS
(Aug.
10,
2016),
https://www.iisd.org/itn/201.6/08/10/unasur-centre-for-the-settlement-of-investment-disputes-comments-on-thedraft-constitutive-agreement-katia-fach-gomez-catharine-titi/.
54 New Investment Arbitration Center in Latin America: UNASUR, A Hybrid Example of Success or Failure?,
KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (May 27, 2016), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/05/27/unasur/.
5 Id; see also Maria Gabriela Sarmiento, The 2014 Draft Constitutive Agreement of the Centre for the
(2015),
SSRN
UNASUR,
of
the
Disputes
Investment
of
Settlement
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=270365 1.
47
48
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negotiations, and stresses that conciliation and arbitration are the last resort to any dispute.S6
The proposed Article 31 provides an appeals mechanism that can be utilized where there is
error in the application of law in the arbitral award. Argentina, Paraguay, and Venezuela
proposed an additional reason for appealing on the basis of a manifest error in the application
of facts." This new framework provides great insight for PPP related disputes, since it favors
negotiations and consultation, as well as conciliation. Increased transparency in dispute
resolution also meets the specific requirements of PPPs, where users and taxpayers are
relevant stakeholders in these projects. More generally, this framework shows that some
countries believe that adjustments in investment arbitration procedures should reflect public
interest related issues. This is particularly true when it comes to PPPs.
Along these same lines, the European Union and Canada have agreed to include a
new approach on investment protection and investment dispute settlement in the EU-Canada
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement ("CETA"). 9 Though only approved by the
European Parliament in February of 2017, the negotiations on a free trade deal between the
European Union and Canada were concluded in 2014 with a reformed investment dispute
settlement system which includes full transparency of proceedings, clear and unambiguous
investment protection standards and an appeals system. 6 0 This represents a radical reform of
the existing ISDS approach and it demonstrates both a growing challenge to the current ISDS
system as well as a move towards establishing a permanent multilateral investment court. 61
Furthermore, the European commitment to the ICS can also be seen in the agreed draft of the
EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement of January 2016 (EUVFTA), which also calls for a
multilateral investment court.62
THE UNCITRAL TRANSPARENCY STANDARDS
63

The Mauritius Convention, which entered into force on October 18, 2017 , is an
instrument by which Parties to investment treaties concluded before April 1, 2014, express
their consent to apply the Rules on Transparency-a set of procedural rules for making
publicly available information on investor-State arbitrations arising under investment
64
treaties.
The Mauritius Convention reads in Article 2(1) and (2) that the Rules on
Transparency apply to disputes initiated based on international investment agreements

Gomez & Titi, supra note 53.
" Sarmiento, supranote 55.
56

58 Sarmiento, supranote 55, at Article 31.

5 European Commission, CETA: EU and CanadaAgree on New Approach on Investment in TradeAgreement,

(February 29, 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1468.
60 Id.
61

Id.

62

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/603844/EXPO_STU(2017)603844 EN.pdf
http://uncitralrcap.org/en/status-alert-mauritius-convention-transparency-enters-force-18-october2017/?ckattempt-l
6'

United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (the 'Mauritius
Convention
on
Transparency'),
UNCITRAL
(January
3,
2017),
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/2014TransparencyConvention.html
[hereinafter
United Nations Convention].
6
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("IIA"s) unless a party declares single or multiple reservations under Article 3 .' In addition,
though a signatory has the flexibility to formulate reservations, whether the arbitration is
initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or not does not have any impact on the
application of the Mauritius Convention.
Regardless of the arbitration rules applied to the dispute, the Mauritius Convention
applies to existing IIAs concluded before April 1, 2014 without formulated reservations,
denunciation, and/or rejection of amendments. The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
("SCC") 6 7 noted that the Mauritius Convention is inapplicable in the following situations,
which provides further clarity on its applicability:
1. Either of the disputing parties has made reservations under the Mauritius
Convention.
2. The home State of the respondent and host State are not parties to the
Mauritius Convention.
Though Article 2(1) specifically mentions the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the
Mauritius Convention is applicable to around 3000 IIAs in force as of April 2014, regardless
of the arbitration rules selected. States that are parties to the Mauritius Convention may
formulate reservations in negative-list approach, for instance, identifying specific IIA(s) to
which the Mauritius Convention is/are not applicable. Even if the home State of the
respondent and host State are not parties to the Mauritius Convention, they may opt to apply
bilaterally and/or unilaterally, the transparency rules and amicus curiae features, thus
expanding the scope of applicable disputes to ad hoc bodies. Once the home State of the
respondent and host State are parties to the Mauritius Convention, the conditions therein
apply prospectively to investor-State disputes save for reservations as per Article 5, rejection
of specific revision of the Mauritius Convention as per Article 10, or denunciation as per
Article 11.61 Both signatory States and regional economic integration organizations must
observe Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, or the obligation not to
defeat the object and purpose of the treaty prior to its entry into force.
According to UNCITRAL, "[t]ogether with the Rules on Transparency, the
Convention takes into the account both the public interest in such arbitration and the interest
of the parties to resolve disputes in a fair and efficient manner." 6 9 The Convention foresees
UNCITRAL performing the repository function, through the Transparency Registry, 70 a
publicly available database on information and documents in treaty-based investor-State
arbitration. While at the time of writing there are 23 signatory and 3 ratifying States 72 and
Article 3(1)(b) reads, "Article 2(1) and (2) shall not apply to investor-State arbitration conducted
using a
specific set of arbitration rules or procedures other than the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, and in which it is a
respondent"; id.
66 United Nations Convention, supra
note 54.
67 Mauritius Convention and UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in SCC Cases,
ARB. INST. OF THE
STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.sccinstitute.com/media/72819/sccapplication-of-mauritius-convention-and-uncitral-rules-on-transparency.pdf
68 C. Montineri, Statement at UNCTAD Expert Meeting on Taking Stock of IIA Reform, UNCITRAL (Mar.
16,
2016), http://unctad-worldinvestmentforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Statement-UNCITRALpdf.
69 United Nations Convention, supra note 54
7o TransparencyRegistry: (a Repository for the Publication
of Information and Documents in Treaty-Based
Investor-State Arbitration), UNCITRAL
(Jan.
3, 2017),
http://www.uncitral.org/transparencyregistry/registry/index.jspx.
7' United Nations Convention, supra note 54, at Article 8.
72 https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg
no=XXII-3&chapter-22&lang-en
65
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the items in the Registry remain sparse, the Mauritius Convention, as commented by Schill, is
a step towards a system of international investment law that is "fundamentally different from
the current one, which is still principally based on confidentiality." 73 Furthermore, the
"normative pull" of the UNCITRAL Transparency Standards and its opt-in nature are
significant in the endeavour to address questions of public interest and possible appellate
body functions.7 4
STREAMLINING THE PROCESS: EXPERT ADJUDICATION/DETERMINATION
AND CONCILIATION
Third-party specialists, such as engineers, can render a technical assessment that
may serve as the basis for conciliation between the contracting parties. Since such third-party
technical specialists are often employed for inspection of projects, they may be ideal
candidates for providing expert determination or adjudication. While conciliation is not
binding and decisions rendered through expert determination can be overturned by binding
arbitration awards, these channels of dispute resolution can serve as basis for further
negotiation or can "impose a decision on the parties" that can result in the settlement of the
dispute. For instance, the model contract for Design Build and Operate Projects of the
Federation International des Ingenieurs Conseils ("FIDIC"), also known as the Gold Book,
has adopted such an approach. The FIDIC standard contracts have a strong influence in the
construction business and are widely used in civil law jurisdictions and by Multilateral
Development Banks. 7 6 Sub-clause 20.5 of the Gold Book emphasizes the necessity to avoid
dispute and provides to a standing Dispute Adjudication Board ("DAB") the role to help
parties to reach agreement through non-binding decisions (or binding, according to what the
parties decided) for disputes occurring during the design and construction stage. 7 Similarly,
Harisankar and Sreeparvathy advocate expert adjudication (expert determination) as a
preferred method of dispute settlement in infrastructure procurement projects, such as PPP.
When writing on dispute resolution for PPP projects in India, Harisankar and Sreeparvathy
stressed that "[a]djudication by statutory expert bodies [...] seems to be a viable model for
dispute resolution in PPP. There are many advantages like diverse expertise, efficiency in
time, less interference by the judiciary, etc., which can be effectively used for structuring a
dispute resolution mechanism."7 A prominent example is the DAB services offered by the
International Chamber of Commerce, which seeks resolution to disagreements before they
become costly and hostile, as well as helping to avoid construction-stop situations and their

7

Stephan W. Schill, Editorial: The Mauritius Convention on Transparency, 16 J. OF

WORLD INV.

& TRADE

203 (2015).
74 Id.

DELMON, supra note 28, at 407-408.
Sebastian Hoek, FIDIC/MDB Approach in Respect of Dispute Adjudication Boards, FIDIC 4, 8 (Feb. 23,
2017),
http://fidic.org/sites/default/files/FIDIC%2OMDB%20
Approach%20in%20respect%20oP/20Dispute%2OAdjudication%20Boards.pdf.
7 Taryn van Deventer, FIDIC:Goingfor Gold- the FIDIC Gold Book and the Race for FirstPlace in Dispute
Resolution!, MDA CONSULTING, (Feb. 23, 2017), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-ebbcl65c8bfa-45c2-9446-0b0f1cd11389.
78 KS Harisankar & G. Sreeparvathy, Rethinking Dispute Resolution in Public-Private Partnershipsfor
InfrastructureDevelopment in India, 5(1) J. OF INFRASTRUCTURE DEV. 21-32 (2013).
7
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consequence.7 9 The ICC features both rules as well as a model contract for the use of DABs,
including designation of Board Members. The use of DABs before resorting to international
arbitration has been a common feature in construction projects, especially in developing or
emerging economies. The use of DABs can act as time and cost saving alternatives to
litigation or arbitration, or as an interim measure leading up to international arbitration. In
Peru, for example, the use of DABs is obligatory before proceeding into other forms of
dispute resolution in circumstances involving public works, such as a PPP. 0 The designation
of "neutrals" at the contract-writing phase makes real-time dispute resolution a possibility
through the assignment of a "standing neutral" third-party who can help guide negotiations. In
the United States, where the use of DABs facilitated by the American Bar Association is
comparatively more common, it has been shown that 208 out of 225 disputes were resolved
81
through DABs with only one proceeding to litigation.
UNITRAL has also renewed its interest in DABs and their role in PPP dispute
resolution. Specifically, at the UNCITRAL Third International Colloquium on PPPs held in
Vienna in October 2017, it was recommended that the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on
Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects and accompanying Legislative Recommendations
(2000) and the UNCITRAL Model Legislative Provisions on Privately Financed
Infrastructure Projects (2003) should continue to be updated and consolidated, partly as a
mean of further emphasizing the use of DABs in PPP disputes.8 2
OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE CURRENT SYSTEM(S) IN PLACE
It must be recognized that different jurisdictions have their own statutory
frameworks in place for resolving disputes of a PPP nature. For example, in India, the Punjab
Infrastructure Law establishes the Punjab Infrastructure Regulatory Authority, which sets
rates for concessionaires and adjudicates disputes between concessionaires. Further
complicating matters, different Indian states have different laws governing dispute resolution
related to infrastructure projects." Partly as a result of the commercial versus investment
dichotomy set-out above, any attempt at unifying all these variant systems seems gargantuan
in scope. As a consequence, unification may not be the best approach.
Additionally, when contemplating how to best create a viable system which both
Sovereign and private-parties will be encouraged to utilize, we must keep in mind all the
discussions about the future of the current investment treaty framework. We need to take into
account the concerns of the investors, engineers, and construction firms, while also
considering the Sovereigns that may from time to time view the system as being stacked

International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), What are Dispute Boards, ARB. & ADR (Feb. 2, 2017),
http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/dispute-boards/.
so Paul Taggart, Dispute Boards as Pre-ArbitrationTools: Recent Developments and PracticalConsiderations,
KLUWER ARB. BLOG, (Feb. 28, 2015), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/02/28/dispute-boards-as-prearbitration-tools-recent-developments-and-practical-considerations/.
" ConstructionBriefing: Dispute Resolution Boards and Other Standing Neutrals, INT'L INST. FOR CONFLICT
PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION (July 15, 2010), https://www.cpradr.org/resource-center/toolkits/constructionbriefing-dispute-resolution-boards-other.
82 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/colloquialpublic-private-partnerships-2017.html
8 Harisankar & Sreeparvathy, supra note 78, at 27.
79
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against them84 . This rings particularly true in regard to PPPs, as PPPs are so often a tool for
building valuable infrastructures that can improve the livelihood of people.
As is also set out above, we should strive to improve the current system(s) by
encouraging transparency and consistency. To that end we proposed the following:
(1) The creation of a "repository"-like organization, or the assignment of such
a role to an existing organization, whose sole directive will be to act as a
collector of PPPs arbitration filings, and to make information related to
said filings available to the public. In this way, it will be relatively easy to
find out how many PPP-related disputes have been filed in a particular
year, and, if the parties were to agree to transparency in relation to their
awards, they could turn to previous awards as a means of seeking out the
wisdom of previous tribunals. Though such previous awards will not
technically act as precedents, they may act as creating an increased sense
of certainty and conformity amongst possible parties to a PPP agreement.
The Transparency Registry, currently run by UNCITRAL, would seem to
be a reasonable repository which could be utilized instantly.
(2) As opposed to setting up an additional treaty-basis of empowerment, the
use of standard PPP ADR clauses should be encouraged. Efforts to enact a
model clause through a recognized legislative international body, such as
UNCITRAL, could lend the necessary legitimacy for its widespread
adoption. Such clauses will require direct disputes involving a Sovereign
to utilize the repository described in (1) above, while also requiring that
transparency, as envisioned by the UNCITRAL Transparency Standards,
to be utilized.
(3) Consider the creation of regional arbitration organizations, such as what is
being attempted in Latin America in relation to Investment State
Arbitration, or as is envisioned in the CETA, which calls for the creation
of some form of a permanent adjudicating body.
(4) Consider the creation of an Appellate Body that can quickly hear appeals
made from ADR (or even possibly court litigation) related to PPPs. Again,
this can be contracted for and the enforcement mechanism can be the New
York Convention, if applicable.8 6
(5) Consideration should be given to streamlining the system of dispute
resolution by requiring attempts at mediation and reconciliation of
disagreements through inter alia an expert adjudication board. Though ad
hoc arbitration with a sole arbitrator may also help streamline the process,
as discussed above, disputes over PPPs are often highly technical, and,
empowering technical experts with the ability to adjudicate may allow for
the creation of a more so efficient adjudication process. Standing

See generally Lee, supra note 2.
See generally Jeffrey P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration - A CitationAnalysis of a
DevelopingJurisprudence,24 J. OF INT'L ARB. 129-58 (2007).
86 Deepu Jojo Sushama, Appellate Structure and Need for Legal Certainty in Investment Arbitration,KLUWER
ARB. BLOG (May 1, 2014), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2014/05/01/appellate-structure-and-need-forlegal-certainty-in-investment-arbitration/.
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(permanent) DABs are also more available, which helps to discuss and find
beneficial solution on technical, commercial or legal matter.17
Note that despite (2) above, the authors are not taking the position that a treatybased system would be inappropriate as a means of addressing transparency issues as they
relate to PPP. Quite the contrary, the authors believe that there is definite merit in
establishing a treaty framework that would apply even retroactively to existing PPP
contracts-unless both Sovereign and private party agree otherwise. In this way parties can
choose to apply transparency without amending agreements or re-commencing negotiations.
Further research is, however, required, before we can make a firm proposal. Issues such as
how a treaty framework might deal with different levels of State involvement in PPP, as well
with similar vehicles, such as private finance initiative ("PFI") will need to be explored. The
authors are hopeful that this paper can act as a catalyst for further research on this topic.
The authors again stress that it is not their desire to re-litigate the state of investment
treaty arbitration and its future. The authors are simply turning to the lessons that the system
has to offer for guidance when addressing the issues of settlement of international PPP-related
disputes. The authors are seeking to continue the momentum towards a system that will
encourage investment in infrastructure projects, while also encouraging transparency. As has
been made clear above, the authors believe that the public nature of PPP projects makes
transparency imperative, regardless of the selected vehicle of dispute resolution. A system in
which both Sovereigns and investors can take solace and comfort is a system that will likely
pass the test of time.

8

Hoek, supra note 76, at 4.
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